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COMMERCIAL DECENCY AND THE CODE-
THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSCIONABILITY VINDICATED
One of the most perplexing twentieth-century legal phenomena is
the rise of the standard form contract1 and its attendant capacity for
abuse. Often termed a "contract of adhesion," "such a contract is 'sold
not bought.' "2 It is a contract the terms of which are imposed upon
the weaker party through a disparity of bargaining power. Application
of the "freedom of contract" concept to such an agreement would
surely be as erroneous as the assumption that the parties' objective con-
sent was given to all of the terms of the contract.3 "[I]f it be a contract
it is like the Apostle's conception of the human frame, 'fearfully and
wonderfully made,' and one upon the construction and effect of which
a competent and experienced lawyer may spend days of careful study
without exhausting its possibilities." 4
Generally, the courts' response to the dilemma has been less than
illuminating. The approach taken has often been one of improvisation
and avoidance rather than development of a general principle con-
demning such abuses.5
A court can "construe" language into patently not meaning
what the language is patently trying to say. It can find incon-
sistencies between clauses and throw out the troublesome one. It
can even reject a clause as counter to the whole purpose of the
transaction. It can reject enforcement by one side for want of
"mutuality," though allowing enforcement by the weaker side
because "consideration" in some other sense is present.6
1. The pioneering work in this area is Isaacs' The Standardizing of Contracts, 27
YALE J. 34 (1917).
2. Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 221 F.2d 189, 204 (2d Cir. 1955) (dissenting
opinion). Certainly the standardization of contracts has been commercially beneficial
and entirely justified when used with discretion. The time and effort of active bar-
gaining is eliminated just as the expenses of administration are reduced. Id. at 205;
Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HAzv. L. Rzv. 700, 701 (1939). Such contracts have even
been used to accomplish an equitable allocation of risk among the parties and to establish
a legal regulation tailored to the needs of the parties and the industry. LLEwEL.YN,
THE CoMMoN LAw TRADTION 362-63 (1960).
3. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
4. New Prague Flouring Mill Co. v. G.A. Spears, 194 Iowa 417, 438-39, 189 N.W.
815, 824 (1922).
5. Heningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 391-92, 161 A.2d 69, 87-88 (1960).
6. Llewellyii, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. Rzv. .700, 702 (1939). See Note, Grower-
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Paying token expression to the traditional bases of contract, the courts
have avoided an inequitable result by the device of "interpretation,"
particularly against the stronger party seeking to enforce the contract.,
The results of these decisions, however, are painfully obvious. They
have left in their wake "twisted" law which serves only to mislead
later courts.9 Furthermore, they fail to establish a series of reliable
precedents from which can be drawn the "minimum decencies" that
a court will insist upon as a prerequisite to enforceability.10
The courts of equity, however, early developed the doctrine of un-
conscionability as a defense to a suit for specific performance." Under
the doctrine, specific performance was denied where the terms of the
contract itself or subsequent events would result in oppression or hard-
ship to the defendant if enforced. 12 Although traditionally employed
for the protection of widows and the weak-minded from the insidious
Canner Agreements: An Abuse of Mass Standard Contracts, 58 YAmz L.J. 1161, 1163-64
(1949).
7. Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 682, 693-95, 268 P.2d 1041, 1047-48
(1954); Hardy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 38 Ga. App. 463, 144 S.E. 327
(1928); F.C. Austin Co. v. J.H. Tillman Co., 104 Ore. 541, 209 P. 131 (1922). See I
CoRBiN o N CoN'rTmcrs S 128 (1963):
There is sufficient flexibility in the concepts of fraud, duress, misrepresen-
tation, and undue influence, not to mention differences in economic bar-
gaining power to enable the courts to avoid enforcement of a bargain that
is shown to be unconscionable by reason of gross inadequacy of considera-
tion accompanied by other relevant factors.
8. Andreasen v. Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 370, 335 F.2d 404 (1959).
9. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-302, Study Comment (1962).
10. Llewellyn, supra note 6, at 703. Pointing out another difficulty of such "twisted"
decisions, Llewellyn adds that ". . . since they all rest on the admission that the clauses
in question are permissible in purpose and content, they invite the draftsman to recur
to the attack." Id.
11. Emanuel College v. Evans, 21 Eng. Rep. 494 (Ch. 1625).
12. Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Electric Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378
(1918); Koch v. Streuter, 232 Ill. 594, 83 N.E. 1072 (1908); Pope Manufacturing Co. v.
Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 236-37 (1892). See generally 1 CoRiN oN Conrr.Acrs § 128
(1963).
The appropriate section of the Restatement states:
Specific enforcement of a contract may be refused if (a) the consideration
for it is grossly inadequate or its terms are otherwise unfair, or (b) its en-
forcement will cause unreasonable or disproportionate hardship or loss to
the defendant or to third persons, or (c) it was influenced by some sharp
practice, misrepresentation, or mistake.
R.EsTATEMNT or CONTRACTS 367 (1932). See also § 302, which excuses non-compliance
with a provision involving extreme forfeiture or penalty; and S 339 dealing with en-
forceability of a liquidated damages provision made in advance of breach.
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designs of those who would prey upon them,"3 the equitable doctrine
of unconscionability has been applied in recent times to the present
problem-the standard form contract. 14 There is also some authority to
the effect that the doctrine may have been available as a defense at law.15
SECTION 2-302 AND THE CRITICS
Such was the state of the law on the eve of the Uniform Commercial
Code. And it was these very deficiencies which prompted the inclusion
of section 2-302 by the Code's draftsmen. 16 One of the most contro-
versial and disputed Code provisions, it has been termed by its author
"perhaps the most valuable section in the entire Code." "I The section
provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it
was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the con-
tract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties
shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence
as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in
making the determination.' s
13. Jackson v. Seymour, 193 Va. 735, 71 S.E.2d 181 (1952); Fish v. Leser, 69 111. 394
(1873).
14. See Campbell Soup Co. v. 1Ventz, 172 F.2d 80 (3rd Cir. 1948).
15. 1955 N.Y. REPORT OF Tm LAW REVISION COMMISSION, Study of the Uniform
Commercial Code 731-32; cf. Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406 (1889) (dicta).
Contra, I CORIBIN oN CoN'mRcrs § 128 (1963).
16. See UNIForM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 1; cf. LLEWELLY N, THE CoM-
MON LAW TRIAPInoN 369 (1960). Though not specifically limited in application to
form contracts, § 2-302 will undoubtedly find its widest use in such cases. Cf. note 51
infra and cases discussed in notes 73 through 103 infra and accompanying text.
17. Testimony of the late Karl Llewellyn in 1954 N.Y. REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION
CoMmIssIoN, Report of Hearings on the Uniform Commercial Code 121; cf. 112.
18. UNIFORM COMMLIERCIAL CODE § 2-302. The policy enunciated in this section is also
applied to § 2-309(3) (declaring invalid any agreement dispensing with notification of
termination by one party where such would be unconscionable), § 2-719(1) (where a
liquidated damages provision may be invalidated when unreasonably large or small)
and § 2-719(3) (which invalidates a limitation upon consequential damages where such
would be unconscionable).
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From its beginnings, this section has inspired a considerable amount of
critical commentary, 19 some justified and some not. The volume of
criticism has caused two states, California" and North Carolina,21 to
deny section 2-302 enactment as a part of their respective Codes. Be-
fore assessing this section's actual impact in the courts, it might, there-
fore, be wise to discuss briefly the criticisms which generally have been
leveled at this section.
Vagueness of the term "unconscionable." While it is true that the
Code nowhere defines "unconscionable," it may be profitable to repeat
one court's recent definition given in reference to section 2-302. "Un-
conscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with con-
tract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party .... In
many cases, the meaningfulness of the choice is negated by a gross
inequality of bargaining power." 22 The vagueness of the term has also
been decried as detrimental to commercial certainty.2
It should be pointed out, in answer, that unconscionability is a con-
cept incapable of exact definition. 24 Indeed, it is axiomatic that such a
broad codification as the Uniform Commercial Code must contain
general clauses expressing a commercial morality which can be applied
to a variety of factual situations.25 Finally, by creating a certain amount
of vagueness, it is argued, the draftsman will be forced to leave a margin
19. The leading critic is Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967).
20. See CAL. COMM. CODE § 2302 (West 1964).
21. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-302 (Rep1. 1965).
22. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
This definition may be compared with Lord Hardwicke's oft-quoted statement that an
unconscionable bargain is one "such as no man in his senses and not under delusion
would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the
other." Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750). This definition
is accepted in Hlume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889). "An unconscionable con-
tract is one abhorrent to good morals and conscience. It is one where one of the parties
takes a fraudulent advantage of another." Hall v. Wingate, 159 Ga. 630, 667, 126 S.E.
796,813 (1924).
23. Testimony of Mr. Mason 0. Damon in 1954 N.Y. REPORT OF Tin LAw REvIsION
COMMISSION, Record of Hearings on the Uniform Commercial Code 1231-2. Cf. Leff,
supra note 19, at 487-88.
24. King, The New Conceptualism of the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 ST. Louis
L.J. 30,41 (1965).
25. Cf. 1955 N.Y. REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, Study of the Uniform
Commercial Code 2175.
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of safety rather than draft dangerously close to the edge of forbidden
conduct.26
In a correlative manner, it has been charged that unconscionabiity
under section 2-302 is nothing more than gross inadequacy of considera-
tion.27 This view has certainly been given impetus by those cases2" in
which excessiveness of price is the principal ground of the court in
reaching its decision. However, in at least two cases,29 deceptiveness of
sales practice constitutes at least an equally important basis for holding
the Code section applicable. In addition, there have been many cases
in which inadequacy of consideration has played little or no part in the
courts' decision.30
26. Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under
the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YAr L.J. 199, 202-03
n.10 (1963). "Some boundaries work best if they are left purposely vague. In con-
tradistinction to the statement of the basic performance and remedial framework,
which must be precise, good faith and unconscionability must remain flexible in order
to be useful." Id. See testimony of the late Karl Llewellyn in 1954 N.Y. REPoRT oF TnE
LAW REvIsION Com~AssioN, Record of Hearings on the Uniform Commercial Code 177-78,
where it is pointed out that the margin of safety which a contract draftsman would
have to leave under section 2-302 would be beneficial to commercial certainty. Cf. note
10 supra.
27. See Leff, supra note 19, at 548; see also Comment, 78 Hamv. L. REv. 895 (1965).
Certainly, inadequacy of consideration will usually be of some importance in any
proceeding under subsection 2-302(2). But just what level of inadequacy will justify a
conclusion of unconscionability is at least partially open to conjecture. Generally, mere
pecuniary inadequacy of consideration does not render a contract unconscionable. See
Chanute Brick & Tile Co. v. Gas Belt Fuel Co., 82 Kan. 752, 109 P. 398 (1910); RE-
sTATEmENT oF CoNTAcrs § 367, Comment (b) (1932). However, where the inadequacy
is so excessive as to "shock the conscience," a presumption of fraud is raised sufficient
to set aside the contract. Sizemore v. Miller, 196 Ore. 89, 247 P. 2d 224 (1952); Schaeffer
v. Moore, 262 S.W. 2d 854 (Mo. 1953).
It is true that there is no exact dividing line between what is unconscionable
and what is not. The disparity between the price paid and the fair market
value . . . must be very great. We think that the Commission was correct
when it said in this case that payment of less than half the true value is un-
conscionable.
Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 281 F. 2d 202, 208-09 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
28. American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A. 2d 886
(1964); Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez, 53 Misc. 2d 620, 279 N.Y.S. 2d 391 (Civ. Ct.
Rec. 1967). The former case is briefly discussed in notes 73 through 76 infra and the
accompanying text.
29. State by Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S. 2d 303 (Sup. Cr.
1966); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S. 2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966).
These two cases are discussed more fully in notes 79 through 86 infra and the ac-
companying text.
30. Robinson v. Jefferson Credit Corp., - Misc. 2d -, N.Y.S.2d - (Sup. Ct.
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Radical novelty to the theory of sales law. Although this section was
early criticized as "embodying new social concepts," 11 at least one
court points out that its policy has long been to declare an unconscion-
able or oppressive clause void.3 2 Furthermore, it is generally agreed
that the equitable doctrine of unconscionability" has been the precursor
for this section.34
Tendency to create excessive litigation. Section 2-302 was written
amid dire predictions that it would lead to an excessive amount of liti-
gation, partially due to its vagueness. 5 Quite the reverse has been the
case, leading some authorities 6 to comment upon the near absence of
cases decided under this section. This fact is all the more interesting
when one surveys the number and breadth of factual situations encom-
passed by the illustrative cases cited in the official comment to the sec-
tion. It is evident that section 2-302 has not found application in the
majority of the type of cases contemplated by its draftsmen.
Determination as a matter of law. In answer to early fears of a de-
1967); Paragon Homes of New England, Inc. v. Langlois, -- Misc. 2d -, - N.Y.S.
2d -- (Sup. Ct. 1967), and the accompanying case of Paragon Homes of Midwest, Inc.
v. Crace, - Misc. 2d -- , -- N.Y.S. 2d - (Sup. Ct. 1967); Electronics Corp. of
America v. Lear Jet Corp., -- Misc. 2d -- , 286 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Fair-
child Lease Corp. v. Colonial Aluminum Sales, Inc., - Misc. 2d -, - N.Y.S. 2d
-- (Sup. Ct. 1966). The first three of these cases are more fully discussed in notes
87 through 91 infra and the accompanying text.
31. 1956 N.Y. REPORr OF TtE LAw RevisioN COMMiSSION, Report Relating to the Uni-
form Commercial Code 37. It appears that North Carolina omitted this section partially
on this mistaken belief. See Clifford, Article Two: Sales, 44 N.C. L. REv. 539, 591-94
(1966).
The policy employed in S 2-302 has long been a feature incorporated in the civil law
development in Germany and France. This is well set out and traced in Note, Un-
conscionable Contracts Under the Uniform Connnercial Code, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 401,
415-18 (1961).
32. American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 439, 201 A.2d 886,
888-89 (1964). Other courts have reached results similar to that indicated by S 2-302,
e.g., Andreasen v. Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 370, 335 P.2d 404 (1959); Imperial Discount Corp.
v. Aiken, 38 Misc. 2d 187, 238 N.Y.S. 2d 269 (Civ. Ct. Rec. 1963).
33. See text accompanying notes 11 through 15 supra.
34. Leff, supra note 19, at 529. As Professor Leff points out, the comment to S 2-302
once read: "This section is intended to apply to the field of Sales the equity courts'
ancient policy of policing contracts for unconscionability or unreasonableness:' UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 1 (1949 version).
35. Testimony of Mr. Mason 0. Damon in 1954 N.Y. REPORT O TIE LAW RsioN
COMMISSION, Report of Hearings on the Uniform Commercial Code 1231-32.
36. N.Y. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Practice Commentary (McKinney
1964); Clifford, supra note 31, at 564. "In the face of these facts, the North Carolina
legislature's objection to the section is mystifying" Id.
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termination of unconscionability by a jury, provision was made that it
shall be a conclusion of law for the court.37 Although this has generally
been regarded as a strength of the section,38 some question may remain,
small as it may be, as to the constitutionality of restricting the determina-
tion of unconscionability to the courts' consideration. 9
Determination as of the time the contract is made. Section 2-302 was
also criticized as allowing the court to determine unconscionability of
a contract or clause at the time of the action rather than at the time
the contract was made.4 The section was then clarified to indicate that
the determination of unconscionability relates to the time the contract
was made.41 Thus corrected, at least one court42 has refused to declare
37. Uwuzoami COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302(1) and Comment 1. Comment 3 provides:
'The present section is addressed to the court, and the decision is to be made by it. The
commercial evidence referred to in subsection (2) is for the court's consideration, not
the jury's. Only the agreement which results from the court's action on these matters
is to be submitted to the general triers of facts."
38. Clifford, supra note 31, at 591-94. Despite this fact the North Carolina rejection
of section 2-302 seems to be due partially to the fact that unconscionability is to be a
matter of law. Id.
Karl Llewellyn points out that since this is a reviewable court action, anything done
under section 2-302 will be a precedent which will serve as a guide in subsequent cases.
1954 N.Y. REPORT OF THE LAW REvIsION COMMIssION, Report of Hearings on the Uni-
form Commercial Code 178.
39. See 1955 N.Y. REPORT OF THE LAW REvISIoN COMIsSION, Study of the Uniform
Commercial Code 733-55.
The Code cannot, by legislative fiat, turn a true question of fact into
a question of law in any state where the Constitution guarantees the right to
a jury trial on questions of fact.
It seems to this consultant that the fair intendment of the language as it
reads . . . is that if the facts are undisputed, or the evidence is such that
any jury verdict that unconscionability did not exist would have to be set
aside, then the court may refuse to enforce the contract or make [sic]
strike or limit the effect of the unconscionable clause.
Obviously, this severely limits the application of subsection (1), confining
it to cases where unconscionability is indisputable, one might say to "ex-
treme" cases. To this extent, the change may be a good one, and help to
meet some of the objections to the prior version of Section 2-302 as being
too broad.
Id. at 733-34.
40. See the testimony of Mr. LeRoy H. Hurlbert in 1954 N.Y. REPORT OF Tim LAw
REvIsION COMMissION, Record of Hearings on the Uniform Commercial Code 1241.
41. See 1955 N.Y. REPORT OF Tan LAW REVIsIoN COMMISSION, Study of the Uniform
Commercial Code 729. Accord, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445
(D.C. Cir. 1965). "In determining reasonableness or fairness, the primary concern must
be with the terms of the contract considered in light of the circumstances existing when
19681 1149
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a contract unconscionable where, at its inception, it was not, even though
its enforcement might have led to an unconscionable result.
The New York Law Revision Commission, however, suggests that
the result which would follow at the time of application and enforce-
ment of the contract should be taken into consideration.4 3  The test,
then, should also be in terms of result, for the defense of unconscion-
ability should not be allowed unless enforcement would actually be
unconscionable. Whether or not the contract was unconscionable at
its inception is an academic question if its subsequent enforcement
would not be.44
The most reasonable solution to this dichotomy would be to require
a showing of unconscionabiity at both the time of inception and the
time of enforcement. While this may somewhat restrict the application
of section 2-302, it seems reasonable that courts would hesitate to give
effect to the section if the contract was clearly not unconscionable at
either of these two periods of time.
Failure to distinguish procedural and substantive unconscionability.
Perhaps the most accurate criticism is that neither section 2-302 nor
its accompanying comment distinguish between procedural and sub-
stantive unconscionability. 45  Or, to express this problem in another
way, the Code fails to differentiate the unconscionable provision buried
in a maze of fine print, and not pointed out to the party "adhering"
to the contract,4 from the unconscionable provision which one know-
ingly assents to as a result of disparity in bargaining power. The ques-
tion becomes whether or not to apply section 2-302 alike to unbar-
gained-for and bargained-for contracts.
the contract was made." Id. at 450. Although this was pointed out in the Comment
to the earlier draft, an insertion of a similar phrase into the body of the section was
the result. Compare UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 1 (1952 version)
with UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302(1), and Comment 1 (1962).
42. Sinkoff Beverage Co., Inc. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 51 Misc. 2d 446, 273 N.Y.S.
2d 364 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
43. 1956 N.Y. REPORT Or THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, Report Relating to the
Uniform Commercial Code 373-74.
44. See 1955 N.Y. REPORT OF THE LAW REVIsIoN COMMISSION, Study of the Uniform
Commercial Code 735-36. Although the test under the present section 2-302 does not
clearly encompass consideration of the result at the time of its enforcement, it is very
unlikely that a court, in absence of unusually compelling reasons, would strike a contract
or clause as unconscionable unless its present enforcement actually would lead to such
a result.
45. This point is most effectively made by Leff, supra note 19.
46. See notes 1 through 4 supra and the accompanying text.
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Early in the drafting history of this section, the Code comment in-
dicated that procedural or unbargained unconscionability was the in-
tended target, and that there was some level of "bargaining conduct
sufficient to insulate from judicial interference a contract which was,
arguably, substantively 'unconscionable.' "4 A later draft,4" however,
brought both procedural and substantive unconscionability within the
meaning of the section.
This distinction was omitted from succeeding drafts,49 suggesting
that both forms of unconscionability may come within the Code's
meaning. It is most probable that the actual bargaining process has lost
its legal relevancy," although in actual practice it is the procedural brand
of unconscionability to which the section will most likely find its widest
application.5 '
Difficulty of evaluating evidence under section 2-302 (2). Subsection
(2) of section 2-302 provides the litigants "... a reasonable opportunity
to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to
aid the court in making its determination." 82 Once the issue of uncon-
47. Leff, supra note 19 at 489. The early draft to which Professor Leff refers is the
MIMO 1941 DRAFr § 1-C, not widely circulated. As he states, this section was with-
drawn for a study by the time of the printed version of the same year. Id. at 489 n.12.
48. UNroRuM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comments 3 and 4 (1949 version). See
Leff, supra note 19 at 494-97. As suggested by Professor Leff, the reason may have
been the difficulty in determining the exact level of bargaining which would insulate
a contract from this section's application. Id.
49. E.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 (1952 version).
50. Under the present Code comment, the "basic test is whether, in the light of the
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or
case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circum-
stances existing at the time of the making of the contract." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-302, Comment 1.
51. It should also be pointed out that nearly all of the "illustrative" cases involve
form contracts. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 1. See also Leff, supra
note 19 at 502-04.
The most carefully thought-out comments on section 2-302 suggest that it
should operate only in those situations where the parties have not really had
an opportunity to bargain over a particular clause. Where bargaining has
occurred and the overwhelming bargaining power of one of the parties has
resulted in the inclusion of the clause then perhaps the section should not
operate to destroy that agreement.
W. HOGAN & N. PENNEY, A NEw LAW FOR BvsNEss DEALINGS: THE UCC 32 (McKinney
1964) (pamphlet).
52. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302(2). The section is quoted in its entirety
in the text accompanying note 18 supra.
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scionability has been raised and accepted by the court, the opportunity
to present evidence becomes mandatory rather than discretionary.53
This subsection has been criticized, rather cryptically, by one com-
mentator, 54 who apparently agrees that the type of evidence which
would be forthcoming under 2-302(2) would be helpful in giving a
court insight into the "commercial setting" of the contract provision,
but, on the other hand, such evidence would not enable the court to pass
judgment on the questions of social policy inherent in a determination
of unconscionability. That is, while technical testimony concerning a
particular industry may be helpful in "resuscitating a provision which
* . . to the uninitiated might appear unreasonable," 11 it would not aid
the court in deciding whether a harsh provision is justifiable as a matter
of social or economic policy.
This "overwhelming question" has not yet seemed to phase those
courts who have shed some light upon the kind of testimony contem-
plated by subsection (2). Said one court:
The manner in which the contract was entered is also relevant
to this consideration. Did each party to the contract, considering
his obvious education or lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity
to understand the terms of the contract, or were the important
terms hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive
sales practices? 6
Other specific evidence which another court 7 has permitted under
subsection (2) includes the relative financial and bargaining positions
of the parties, the extent of usage of the provisions throughout the in-
dustry, the extent to which the contract reflects the risks involved, the
availability of other bargaining sources, and the possible effects of in-
validating a provision or contract upon similar bargains in the future.58
53. Sinkoff Beverage Co., Inc. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 51 Misc. 2d 446, 448, 273
N.Y.S. 2d 364, 366 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (Dicta); 1955 N.Y. REPORT OF THE LAw REVISION
COMMISSION, Study of the Uniform Commercial Code 729.
54. Leff, supra note 19, at 543-46.
55. Id. at 543. Cf. the testimony of Mr. Mason 0. Damon in 1954 N.Y. REmorr oF
THE LAW REvIsION COMMISSION, Record of Hearings on the Uniform Commercial
Code 1232.
56. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co, 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
57. In Re Elkins-Dell Manufacturing Co, 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
58. Id. at 874. "It was suggested that a clause be added to the second subsection ol
the section stating that 'no trade usage or practice shall preclude the court from finding
1152 [ Vol. 9:1143
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The implementation of the specific class of evidence anticipated by
subsection (2) is certainly not novel in controversies similar to those
for which the subsection was fashioned. The Restatement of Contracts
clearly contemplates this same kind of testimony.59 Professor Corbin
explicitly declares that most of these same questions should be con-
sidered by the court in analogous situations.60 Indeed, Professor Corbin
suggests inclusion of the additional evidence of whether or not the
parties' attention was called to the provision in question and whether
the signer could reasonably expect such a provision to be contained in
the contract.6 ' A number of recent cases decided under section 2-302
have employed this type of evidence, 62 while a few others have re-
manded the case to the lower court for a hearing in view of subsec-
tion (2).63
Unsuitability of doctrine of unconscionability. Tracing the ancestry
of section 2-302 to the equitable doctrine of unconscionability, one
writer 64 points out that the doctrine was peculiarly suited to the dramatic
situations of overreaching by the stronger party that can only occur in
.an idividualized bargaining situation. The draftsmen of the Code, on
the other hand, contemplate application of section 2-302 to the modem
mass transaction characterized by its lack of bargaining. "Equity dealt
with the pathology of bargaining. The Code deals with the pathology
of nonbargaining." 65
Let it be shown, in answer, that although the section's roots are in
the equitable doctrine,66 the section is more than a mere codification of
that a provision is unconscionable."' 1956 N.Y. REPORT OF THE LA.W RzviszoN COM-
JiSSioN, Report Relating to the Uniform Commercial Code 374.
59. See RESTATEmENT OF CoNrrAeCrs § 367 and Comment b (1932).
60. 1 CORBIN ONr CONTRACTS § 128 (1963).
61. Id.
62. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (re-
lative bargaining positions); State by Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc, 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275
N.Y.S. 2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (maze of fine print and deceptive sales practice); Frosti-
fresh Corp, v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S. 2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966) (lack of
education and incapability of understanding the terms; maze of fine print and deceptive
sales practice); In Re Elkins-Dell Manufacturing Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966)
(availability of alternative bargaining sources).
63. Williams v. Valker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F. 2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez, 53 Misc. 2d 620, 279 N.Y.S. 2d 391 (Civ. Ct. Rec.
1967).
64. Leff, supra note 19 at 537.
65. Id. See also 1956 N.Y. REPORT OF THE LAW REvisioN ComtissioN, Report Relating
xo the Uniform Commercial Code 373-74.
66. See notes 33 and 34 supra and the accompanying text.
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the doctrine of unconscionability. For while the equitable doctrine, by
comparison, had all the unwieldiness of a bludgeon, the Code section
is designed to be used with the precision of the surgeon's scalpel. More
particularly, section 2-302 provides for a selection of remedies to be,
tailored to the individual needs of the case.
Under this section the court, in its discretion, may refuse to en-
force the contract as a whole if it is permeated by the uncon-
scionability, or it may strike any single clause or group of clauses
which are so tainted or which are contrary to the essential pur-
pose of the agreement, or it may simply limit unconscionable
clauses so as to avoid unconscionable results. 67
This flexibility permits the court to face the issue squarely by limiting
the impact of section 2-302 to the specific problem at hand.6 In this
fashion, the rejection of an entire contract due to the unconscionability
of a clause not in issue may be avoided. 69
THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSCIONABILITY VINDICATED
The most serious of the charges brought against section 2-302 has
been the claim that this new power given the court would lead to gen-
erally irresponsible action. The most prominent contention in this re-
spect is that the courts are given unlimited power to "make a contract
for the parties to which they have not agreed." 70 In short, the section
".. . could result in the renegotiation of contracts in every case of dis-
agreement with the fairness of provisions the parties had accepted." 71
67. UNIFORIv COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 2 (1962). See § 2-302(1), quoted in
text accompanying note 18 supra.
68. Clifford, supra note 31 at 563-64.
69. Id.; 1956 N.Y. REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION CoMMIssIoN, Report Relating to the
Uniform Comercial Code 37. Thus, the result anticipated by section 2-302 can be
favorably compared with that reached in Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F. 2d
80 (3rd Cir. 1948) (decided under the equitable doctrine of unconscionability) where,
as Professor Leff contends, the entire contract was invalidated as a result of the un-
conscionability of a clause not actually involved in the dispute. Leff, supra note 19,
at 538.
70. 1954 N.Y. REPORT OF TiE LAw REVIsION COMMIssioN, Record of Hearings on the
Uniform Commercial Code 98.
71. California State Bar Connnittee on the Conmercial Code, A Special Report, 37
CALIF. BAR J. 135-36 (1962). The reaction of the Uniform Commercial Code Permanent
Editorial Board to this criticism and the resulting omission of section 2-302 from the
California Code was that ". . . California courts had reached the same kind of result
by forced construction. This is an issue of policy which has been fully debated many
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In view of the fact that a number of decisions have been handed down
,employing section 2-302, the time is ripe for a reevaluation of the sec-
tion's impact. In the words of one writer: "It is time to stop evaluating
the Code by the standards of the past and to inquire instead into its
own merits, into the adequacy of its solutions to the many commercial
problems with which a mid-20th century statute must deal." 72
The first reported case employing Code section 2-302 was the amptly
discussed case of American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver 3
The court there alluded to the contract's unconscionable features, prin-
cipally the gross inadequacy of consideration involved.74 Admittedly
leaving much to be desired in clarity,75 the case has nonetheless been
recognized for its general proposition that extreme inadequacy of con-
sideration may constitute unconscionability. 76
The prominent case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,77
however, stands as a landmark in the field of sales law. During the
period from 1957 to 1962 the defendant purchased household items to-
talling $1800 under a contract providing for repossession of all items
previously bought in the event of default. With a balance of $164, the
defendant bought a stereo set for $514.95, defaulted, and contested the
repossession of all previously bought and paid-for items.
Although the features of the contract which the court in the Williams
case had termed unconscionable were not specifically identified, it ap-
pears most likely that the culprit was the contract's "add-on" provision.
The court, however, refused to make a determination of unconscion-
ability as a matter of law, choosing instead to refer the case to the lower
court for further proceedings on this issue.78
times, and no new consideration has been advanced in the California discussion."
PERaMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE, REPORT No. 2 35
(1965).
72. Peters, supra note 26, at 199-200.
73. 105 N.H. 435, 201 A. 2d 886 (1964), noted in 78 HARv. L. REv. 895 (1965).
74. The defendant, after receiving an estimate for home improvement of $1759
($800 of which was for sales commission), obtained financing covering five years totalling
$2,568.60. id.
75. See the criticism of this case in Leff, supra note 19, at 547-51.
76. See the discussion supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
77. 350 F. 2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), noted principally in 54 Gao. L.J. 703 (1966) and
79 HARv. L. REv. 1299 (1966). Although the decision preceded the effective date of
the Uniform Commercial Code in the District of Columbia, the court specifically
employs section 2-302, calling the enactment persuasive authority for adopting the rule
involved as a part of their common law development. Id. at 448-49.
78. Id. at 450.
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In addition to these noteworthy cases, a number of more recent de-
cisions on the section have been reported. In State by Lefkorwitz v.
ITM, Inc.,79 the court implemented section 2-302 to enjoin enforcement
of contracts secured by the respondent through a high pressure referral-
type sales program80 coupled with misrepresentations, threats, and prices
varying from two to six times the cost. The court stated:
In American Home Improvement Inc. v. MacIver, the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire refused to enforce a contract uncon-
scionable on grounds of price alone .... The same disparity exists
in the transactions in the instant case to clearly render such trans-
actions unconscionable and when the deceptive practices are also
considered, there can be no doubt about the unreasonableness and
unfairness of these agreements. No longer do we believe that
fraud can be perpetrated by the cry of "caveat emptor." 81
That section 2-302 was appropriately applied in this case cannot be
doubted. The abuses outlined were blatantly obvious, and the court's
refusal to enforce such a contract would seem necessary regardless of
the method employed to reach this result. The remedy chosen clearly
fits the Code's statement that the court ". . . may refuse to enforce the
contract as a whole if it is permeated by the unconscionability. .. " 82
Another case involving both inadequacy of consideration and decep-
tive sales practice is Frostifresh v. Reynoso. 3 Here, although the nego-
tiation was made orally in Spanish, the standard form contract was
written in English and neither translated nor explained to the defendant.
Despite the defendant's insistence that he could not afford the appliance,
the plaintiff's salesman explained that the refrigerator-freezer would
cost nothing due to the "commissions" to be earned by similar sales to
the defendant's neighbors and friends. By the contract, however, the
sales price was set at $900 plus $245.88 credit charge for the same ap-
pliance which admittedly had cost the plaintiff corporation $348. Finding
79. 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S. 2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
80. But cf. Lundstrom v. Radio Corporation of America, 17 Utah 2d 114, 405 P. 2d
339 (1965), where the court upheld a referral-type sales contract in a similar factual
situation, holding that the excessiveness of price ". . has nothing to do with the
legality of the contracts." Id. at 119, 405 P. 2d at 342.
81. 52 Misc. 2d at 54, 275 N.Y.S. 2d at 321 (citations omitted).
82. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 2 (1962). See note 67 supra.
83. 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S. 2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd on amount of damages
although affd on issue of unconscionability under section 2-302, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281
N.Y.S. 2d 964 (App. T. 1967).
1156 [Vol. 9:1143
COMMERCIAL DECENCY & THE CODE
the contract "permeated with unconscionability," the court refused en-
forcement, allowing the plaintiff a reasonable price84 for the appliance.
The price alone, said the court, was ". . . indicative of the oppression
which was practiced on these defendants." 85 The court further pointed
out the defendant's ignorance of the contractual terms and of the gen-
eral commercial situation.86 And here again, the appropriateness of the
application of section 2-302 cannot be doubted, for it is such abuses
that the Code is focused upon.
Several examples can be found where the court has exercised its selec-
tion of remedies tailored to the needs of the case. For example, in Para-
gon Homes of New England, Inc. v. Langlois,87 the contract involved
contained a provision whereby the parties submitted to New York as the
forum for legal redress, the defendants asserting that consent to the
provision was unknowingly and fraudulently obtained. No valid reason
appears for insertion or enforcement of this provision since the contract
was executed and breached in Masachusetts. Furthermore, the plaintiff
corporation was licensed in Massachusetts, and not authorized to do
business in New York. Finally, the defendant was also a resident of
Massachusetts. 8
Clearly, the provision in question was inserted to vex and harass the
defendant in any subsequent attempt either to prosecute or defend any
action arising from the contract. As the court, in an alternative holding,
stated, such a provision should be stricken as unconscionable under sec-
tion 2-302.89 The invalidity of any claim that the court has "made a
contract for the parties to which they have not agreed" is painfully
obvious.
The case of Robinson v. Jefferson Credit Corp.90 also employs sec-
tion 2-302 in preventing what the court characterizes as unconscionable
84. As set out by the Supreme Court on appeal, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 964
(App. T. 1967).
85. Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d at 27, 274 N.Y.S. 2d at 759 (Dist. Ct.
1966).
86. Id.
87. -- Misc. 2d -, - N.Y.S. 2d - (Sup. Ct. 1967). The companion case, de-
cided under virtually identical facts, is Paragon Homes of Midwest, Inc. v. Crace,
Misc. 2d -, - N.Y.S. 2d - (Sup. Ct. 1967).
88. Paragon Homes of New England, Inc. v. Langlois, -- Misc. 2d -, - N.YS.
2d - (Sup. Ct. 1967). On these facts, the court dismissed the plaintiff's action
primarily on the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
89. Id.
90. -- Misc. 2d -, - N.Y.S. 2d - (Sup. Ct. 1967).
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conduct even though allowed under the contract. After the plaintiff
fell two weeks behind in his payments under a retail installment con-
tract for an automobile, the defendant corporation repossessed the car.
The plaintiff subsequently paid the arrears along with late charges and
a "repossession fee." The defendant, however, refused to return the
car, asserting the plaintiff's financial insecurity.
The court in the Robinson case points out the inconsistency in al-
lowing the defendant corporation's claim for overdue payments, late
charges, and a repossession fee while refusing to return the automobile.
Such conduct, says the court, ". . . cannot withstand comparison to
the requisite standard of commercially reasonable conduct required
under the Code." 91
In light of these cases, it would appear that the general criticism of
irresponsibility would have no application. Rather than making contracts
to which the parties have not agreed, the Code section could realistically
be characterized as preserving the contract which the deceived party
had thought he had made. One commentator has reached the conclusion
that the reported cases reveal that the courts have not abused their
powers under section 2-302, and that such fears have been unjustified.92
Similarly, other writers feel that the section's impact may well be to
lessen the courts' willingness to strike or modify the contract,9 3 for
"... the primary purpose of the section was . . . to provide a basis on
Which contracts might be preserved from destruction on grounds of
unconscionability." 94
The restraint shown by the courts in employing section 2-302 is
further revealed by the fact that several of the cases considered above95
employ the Code section only as an alternative holding. The fact that
the same conclusions were reached on other grounds indicates that the
Code has not caused the courts to abuse their discretion under the
section.
It should also be noted that a few courts,96 though considering section
91. Id.
92. N.Y. UNIFORM COMM. CODE § 2-302, Practice Commentary.
93. HOGAN & PENNEY, supra note 51 at 31.
94. 1956 N.Y. REPORT OF THE LAw REVISioN COMMISSioN, Report Relating to the
Uniform Commercial Code 37.
95. American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A. 2d 886
(1964); Paragon Homes of New England, Inc. v. Langlois, - Misc. 2d -, - N.Y.S.
2d -- (Sup. Ct. 1967).
96. In Re Advance Printing & Litho Co., - F.2d - (3rd Cir. 1967); In Re Elkins-
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2-302, have declined to apply the Code in reaching their conclusior.
This in itself is evidence that the courts have tended not to abuse the
"unlimited" power given them. An obvious example of this is Sinkoff
Beverage Co., Inc. v. Schlitz Brewing Co.,97 where the plaintiff had con-
tracted to purchase beer from Schlitz with no exclusive rights granted,
The contract provided that either party might terminate the contract
at any time. Actually, the plaintiff had exclusive distributorship for
the six years during which time he had expanded his facilities in reliance
on a continued relationship. When Schlitz gave ten days' notice of can-
cellation, the plaintiff sought to enjoin Schlitz, demanding the right
under section 2-302, as applied in section 2-309(3), to one year's notice
of cancellation. I I I
The court in the Sinkoff case held that section 2-302 applies the test
of unconscionability to the circumstances at the time the contract was
made,98 therefore finding the contract's power of termination not to be
unconscionable. In fact, the court noted that the contract was very
beneficial to Sinkoff at the time it was executed.
As for the related criticism that section 2-302 prevents a legitimate
allocation of risk among the parties to the contract, at least one com-
mentator99 denies this, even where such allocation results from a dis-
parity of bargaining power. So also does the case of In Re Elkins-Dell
Manufacturing Co.1°0 deny that the parties will not be allowed a legiti-
Dell Manufacturing Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Fairfield Lease Corp. v.
Colonial Aluminum Sales, Inc., - Misc. 2d -, - N.Y.S. 2d - (Sup. Ct. 1966).
A number of other cases can readily be found where section 2-302 is never men-
tioned even though the facts and holding clearly fits within the section's anticipated
range; e.g., Imperial Discount Corp. v. Aiken, 38 Misc. 2d 187, 238 N.Y.S. 2d 269 (Civ.
Cr. Rec. 1963). Another case clearly anticipating adoption of the Code is Andreasen v.
Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 370, 335 P. 2d 404 (1959), where the court said that "application
of the contract provision as contended for by the plaintiffs would amount to such an
unconscionable imposition upon the defendants under the circumstances that courts
should not tolerate nor enforce if avoiding doing so can be justified under law." Id. at
377, 335 P. 2d at 409.
97. 51 Misc. 2d 446, 273 N.Y.S. 2d 364 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
98. See text accompanying notes 40 through 44 supra.
99. Micit. ComiLED LAws AmN. § 440.2302, Practice Commentary (1967). Accord,
UiNroRm CoMz iRCIL CODE § 2-302, Comment 1 (1962).
100. 253 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Pa. 1966). In this case, the defendant entered into a
security agreement under which the plaintiff was to advance money to the defendant
against an assignment of accounts receivable. The disparity of bargaining power is
revealed by the fact that the defendant was permitted to finance only through the
plaintiff although the plaintiff could refuse to supply the funds. The plaintiff also had
the unilateral power to change the terms of the contract merely by giving notice; and
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mate allocation of risk. Though declining to base its decision upon the
Code section, the court in In Re Elkins-Dell stated that the contractual
terms must bear no reasonable relation to the risks involved before they
may be struck as unconscionable. In using section 2-302, courts should,
as In Re Elkins-Dell points out, consider the effects of holding the con-
tract or clause in question unenforceable on the future of similar busi-
ness contracts. Adding a realistic warning to the use of section 2-302
where the allocation of risk has the aura of legitimacy, the court stated:
It would be an egregious instance of "yielding to pity for the
individual case at the cost of a more inclusive rescue." ...
To hold these contracts unenforceable on their face would
probably be to impose a judicially invented but economically
dysfunctional morality upon knowledgeable contracting parties.
. . . It would be to add a risk of unenforceability to the other
risks inherent in such [contracts].101
In short, the courts are painfully aware of the danger of striking down
a commercially reasonable allocation of risk. Properly employed, there
is little peril that section 2-302 will destroy the ability of the weaker
party to make the contract which it needs most and can obtain only by
assuming, legitimately, the burden of risks.
CONCLUSION
The Code section 2-302 is most certainly not a panacea for the legal
implications of the 'boiler-plate' contract. Admittedly, the section does
have certain shortcomings which may or may not present a handicap in
the judicial administration of that section.
However, the breadth of criticism which this section has inspired
seems to be out of any reasonable proportion to the timidity with
which the courts have accepted the provision. Indeed, it may be sur-
mised that it is this amplitude of commentary which is responsible for
the courts' timidity. The opportunity of 2-302 receiving a just trial in
such an atmosphere must accordingly be diminished.
A number of courts have, however, braved the invective surrounding
2-302. On several occasions this Code provision has even been observed
as persuasive authority for decisions regarding both contracts made be-
the defendant could not suspend its business or file a Voluntary Petition for Bankruptcy
without the plaintiff's consent.
101. Id. at 871-72 (emphasis added).
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fore the adopting of the Uniform Commercial Code 0 2 and contracts
outside the field of sales. 10 So also, the number of reported cases em-
ploying the section seems to be growing as courts gain confidence in the
section as an instrument of "commercial decency." Hopefully, this trend
will continue, for those cases already reported show promise in the
rationality of recourse and result reached.
Paul M. Morley
102. E.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F. 2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960).
103. E.g, In Re Elkins-Dell Manufacturing Co, 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
As to whether the Uniform Commercial Code in general and section 2-302 in particular
will fuel judicial reasoning in areas other than sales, see 1 CORBIN ON CoNTRACTs § 128,
n.94 (1963).
"Since the problem of distortion and the undesirability of enforcing unconscionable
agreements are not at all confined to the sale of goods, the fundamental approach
advanced by the Code should be considered applicable in a variety of contracting
situations beyond its terms." Note, The Uniform Conmercial Code As A Premise for
Judicial Reasoning, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 880, 892 (1965). See generally, Pound, Conmnnon
Law and Legislation, 21 HAutv. L. REV. 383 (1908).
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